Perspectivalism and Blaming by Ann, Dana
Occam's Razor




Western Washington University, dana.ann@wwu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/orwwu
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Western Student Publications at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Occam's Razor by an authorized editor of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann, Dana (2016) "Perspectivalism and Blaming," Occam's Razor: Vol. 6 , Article 5.
Available at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/orwwu/vol6/iss1/5





Using the combination of two views of blame from T. M. Scanlon and J. 
J. C. Smart, I will support my thesis perspectivalism, that blame from the 
perspective of a third party is fundamentally dierent than blame from 
the perspective of an injured party. By presenting examples that illustrate 
common beliefs concerning hypocrites and cases involving moral luck, I 
will give reasons as to why perspectivalism has strong explanatory value, and 
also provide motivation for considering blame as a complex topic requiring 
a pluralist theory. In doing this, I will show that two statements about 
hypocrites are true if we accept perspectivalism. First, as many philosophers 
have noted, hypocrites lose their standing to blame from a third party 
perspective. Second, with my new understanding of blaming as the injured 
party, I will conclude that hypocrites retain their standing to blame in the 
injured perspective in virtue of their relationship to the wrong doing. In 
the case of the moral luck examples, I will illustrate the complexity that 
comes from having two types of blame. Ultimately, I will argue that a correct 
general theory of blame must consider the position of the blamer relative 
to an instance of wrongdoing, using the explanatory value of the hypocrite 
cases, without taking a stand on a specic theory of blame.  
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In spite of the intuitiveness of this 
response, in this paper I will argue that 
the common views on hypocrisy correctly 
interpret the moral standing of the 
hypocrite as a third party blamer, but fail 
to recognize the key dierence between 
blaming from a third party perspective 
and blaming from the perspective of 
an injured party. I will argue that there 
is a morally relevant feature of being a 
member of an injured party that allows 
the standing of even a hypocritical victim 
to remain intact; that where an individual 
is placed relative to an instance of 
wrongdoing makes a dierence to 
whether their own faults are relevant to 
their standing to blame. I shall refer to 
this view as perspectivalism.
e topic of this paper hinges on the 
claim that blame from the perspective 
of a person who is not directly—or 
is indirectly—harmed in the given 
circumstances, or third party blamer, 
diers crucially from blame that comes 
from the perspective of a person who has 
been directly wronged, known as injured 
party blamer. e motivation for this 
1. OUR TWO TYPES  
OF BLAME
INTRODUCTION
is claim against the hypocrite’s standing to blame is a 
common view shared by many philosophers; for more examples, 
see Dworkin 2000, Cohen 2012, Wallace 2011.  
Perspectivalism 
That blame from the perspective of a third 
party is fundamentally different than blame 
from the perspective of an injured party.
Imagine a grocery store owner watching in surprise and shock 
as a thief steals a can of soup and exits the store. It seems right 
to say that the owner has both the epistemic justication for 
their belief that they have been wronged, and also the moral 
standing to blame the thief for that wrong.  
Now imagine a second scenario, in which an individual is 
walking down the street and is carelessly knocked to the ground. 
To that individual’s surprise, their bag has gone missing, along 
with the person who knocked them down. Again, it seems right 
to say that the individual on the street has both the epistemic 
justication for their belief that they have been wronged, and 
the moral standing to blame the thief for wronging them.  
But what if I told you that the thief from the rst 
scenario is the victim in the second? Assuming that they had 
no permissible excuse for their actions in the initial instance, 
would it not seem absurd for them to feel anger about being 
a victim of theft when they were, just the other day, stealing 
from the grocery store? By becoming upset when their bag was 
stolen, the thief in the original scenario ts the description of 
a “garden-variety hypocrite,” an individual who “unrepentantly 
engages in the very activity they’re blaming others for” (Coates 
2016, 19). We tend to respond to these types of blamers 
with the comments like “Look who’s talking,” because of the 
perceived inconsistency that exists between their actions and 
expressed blame. 
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For Scanlon, 
...to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action 
is to claim that that action shows something about the 
agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs the rela-
tions that others can have with him or her. To blame a 
person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy and 
to take your relationship with him or her to be modi-
ed in a way that this judgment of impaired relations 
holds to be appropriate. (Scanlon 2008, 125) 
thesis came from con«icting intuitions 
that T.M Scanlon and J. J. C. Smart both 
posit correct theories of blame. For the 
purpose of my conclusion, I will illustrate 
how they can be combined to support the 
theory of perspectivalism. I do not argue 
in favor of either of Smart’s or Scanlon’s 
views; for the sake of this paper I will 
assume they are correct, as my goal is to 
show that, for the case of the hypocrite, 
perspectivalism has both consistency and 
explanatory power, and shows complexity 
in the cases involving moral luck.
First, Smart’s cognitive theory 
of blame boils down to placing, not 
necessarily emotionally, an evaluation 
that the performer of some action has 
done something morally wrong in 
performing said action, and implies 
they’re responsible for the action. is 
is not to say that emotions do not 
accompany third party blame, but rather 
that this type of blame is su¥cient in and 
of itself, without considering emotional 
aspects. Similar to how an art piece is 
graded as being good or bad, to blame 
someone is to place a negative evaluation on that person’s action. 
But unlike the grading of art, the latter type of evaluation 
implies the individual has a moral responsibility for their action. 
Smart argues that blame is a dispassionate and clearheaded 
response to action, but he acknowledges that most people do 
not praise or blame in this dispassionate way. Utilizing Scanlon’s 
view of blame, we can nd motivations as to why it’s not usual 
to blame dispassionately. As Scanlon suggests, relationships are 
‘‘constituted by certain attitudes and dispositions’’ among which 
‘‘intentions and expectations about how the parties will act 
toward one another’’ are most important (Scanlon 2008, 131). 
To impair the relationship is to damage the expectations of how 
each party will interact with each other. To blame, then, is to 
register that damage has been done to the relationship and the 
subsequent need for modication. 
Now, here we see that Scanlon’s objection to Smart’s 
understanding of blame is that the latter failed to recognize the 
sense of force behind blame, or the specic damage done to 
the injured party, which comes from the issue of treating all 
blame as being identical. However, if we take perspectivalism 
to be true, there is no need to require that third party blaming 
have the same sense of force as does injured party blaming. 
is means we could grant that third party blaming is, at a 
minimum, a dispassionate evaluation of wrongdoing that 
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implies responsibility, while acknowledging that direct harm 
done to an injured party allows for reactionary blame, which 
takes into account Scanlon’s concept of the force of blame.  
Going forward, I will rely on Smart’s theory to represent 
third party blame, and Scanlon’s view to represent injured party 
blame, which will demonstrate the consistency and explanatory 
power that perspectivalism has in the case of the hypocrite.
Imagine the thief who stole the can of soup is later arrested 
for stealing jewels from a jewelry store, and is sent to prison. 
Once there, the thief nds that a few personal items are missing. 
After investigating, the thief comes to the epistemically sound 
and justied conclusion that the guards have been stealing the 
items. Enraged by this conclusion, the thief blames the guards 
for committing this wrong.  
e value of this example lies in its ability to illustrate 
how the victim may appropriately blame the guards, in spite 
of having unrepentantly engaged in precisely the same sorts 
of behavior they now blame the guards for. And even though 
the thief would lose the standing to blame the guards for 
stealing from other inmates, since that thief has committed a 
similar act before and is likely to reoend, they still have the 
standing to react specically to the wrongs of which they are the 
injured party.  
Scanlon’s view would acknowledge that guards owe 
inmates specic types of interactions, and that these obligations 
are grounded in the expectations that guards and inmates may 
reasonably have of each other, in virtue of the nature of their 
relationship in the moral community. By stealing from this 
individual, the guards have modied the relationship between 
the two parties in a negative way and have thereby impaired 
the original relationship. e inmate’s response of blaming is 
not simply an acknowledgement of the guards’ wrongdoing, 
but also a reactionary response to the guards’ failure to fulll 
2. HYPOCRITICAL BLAME
the expectation of the relationship. is 
would account for why, had the guards 
returned the missing items, the inmates 
would most likely not respond with 
abandoning their blame.  
Now, imagine this same inmate is 
not the injured party, but rather a third 
party blamer. It seems that in this circum-
stance, the guards could respond to their 
blame with the comment “Look who’s 
talking.” Here, such a response is su¥cient 
to highlight the inmate’s loss of the moral 
standing to blame. Since the inmate 
has no other areas they can criticize, 
and given that they have not person-
ally suered harm to any relationship, 
the inmate’s blame now seems to be 
inappropriate. 
Of course, there are circumstances 
wherein the injured party could involve 
more individuals than just the direct vic-
tim. Another inmate, who is emotionally 
close to the party by virtue of their 
intimate relationship, has cause to be a 
part of the injured party. Moreover, when 
the warden nds out about the actions 
of the prison guards, their blame could 
be considered as that of an injured party, 
given the expectations regarding the 
relationship between the warden and 
the guards. 
In comparison, everyone watching 
the news of the prison guards being 
caught and arrested for stealing from 
the inmate, would be blaming from a 
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third party perspective. Since they are 
not family members of the guards or of 
the inmate, their blame would simply be 
acknowledging the fault in the guard’s 
actions, and implying that the guards 
are responsible for those wrongdoings. 
It seems that perspectivalism, using the 
respective theories of Scanlon and Smart, 
supports the existence of these two distinct 
functions of blame.   
Imagine now that, on one unfortunate 
night, a morally conscious person is 
driving down a residential street. is 
individual is a good driver, who takes into 
account the safety of others and does their 
3. ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES 
CONCERNING MORAL LUCK 
Moral Community 
 In this paper, “moral community” is used to 
reference how a hypothetical community, 
bound by an identical moral theory of right 
action, would evaluate specific events. It is 
not required, within this essay, to confirm the 
exact theory of right action, as it relies on 
basic responses given in the domain of 
moral responsibility. 
Unblameworthy 
An evaluation that a moral individual is not 
responsible or fitting of blame for a given 
event or act. This paper pushes against the 
claim that an unblameworthy agent by the 
moral community is identically unblameworthy 
by the injured party. 
Moral Luck 
 Area within ethics, which studies the 
influence of factors that are out of an 
agent’s control in relation to whether that 
agent can be an object of moral judgement 
specific to a variety of different categories 
(actions, character disposition, casual events, 
circumstantial events, etc.).
best to follow all driving restrictions. On this occasion, even as 
the driver is paying close attention to their surroundings, a small 
child runs out into the street, and the driver is unable to stop 
in time to avoid a collision. Society and the moral community 
will write this o as an unavoidable accident and hold no one at 
fault; but what about the child’s parents? Can these individuals 
still blame the driver for the loss of their child, when the moral 
community nds the driver to be unblameworthy? 
My thesis of blame, which combines specically the 
views of Scanlon and Smart, would allow for the parents of 
the deceased child to—in fact—appropriately blame the driver 
under these exact circumstances. It is true that the driver is not 
responsible for the child running into the street, nor for the 
subsequent harm to that child, but the parents are still left with 
a loss. Even though the driver did not mean for this horrible 
event to happen, that individual is still the direct cause of the 
child’s death. is is a strong example for many reasons. First, 
it is honest about the ways in which our society operates, and 
it has explanatory power; sadly, there are parents who have 
experienced such tragic events, and there are also people that 
are involved in such tragic accidents despite being safe drivers. 
Second, I have the internal motivation to protect the driver from 
the blame of the parents because I could easily nd myself in a 
similar position. On the other hand, I could just as easily be in 
the position of the parents, who have lost a loved one. Because 
both motivations are present, this serves as an intuitive example 
for the distinction between the blame from the perspective of 
an injured party versus that of a third party, and gives more 
reason to believe the two kinds of blame are fundamentally 
dierent. Speaking from the third party perspective and as a 
member of the moral community, I would say that the driver 
is not responsible for the death of the child because the event 
was out of their control, and there are no actions of the driver 
to be criticized; the tragic outcome is merely the result of moral 
luck. However, if I was speaking from the perspective of the 
injured party, I would need to acknowledge the loss, and the 
resulting modication to the relationship of the members. It 
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is a reactionary expression from the perspective 
of the parents, but this example as whole, shows 
the complexity of both perspectives. Although 
the consequences that result from cases that are 
in«uenced by moral luck are controversial, and so 
my point can be similarly seen as controversial, it 
is worthwhile to consider the complexity of two 
dierent perspectives of blame.
It seems that our intuitions about blame support the 
conclusion that some people have greater claims to 
blaming than others; perhaps this a result of injured 
party blamers blaming in this very distinct way, 
specically in cases concerning where the hypocrite 
has the standing to blame as the injured party. Smart 
and Scanlon both oer insight into distinct modes 
of blame. Of course, other theories of blame may not 
t so perfectly with the theory of perspectivalism as 
those oered by Smart and Scanlon, being that one 
is a cognitive theory of blame and the other conative. 
For example, it is not clear to me that emotional 
theories of blame could accurately t into this 
framework. Putting this concern aside, my hope is 
that, even if one rejects Scanlon’s and/or Smart’s view, 
the reader will still be left with motivation to see that 
there are dierent types of blame. It is intuitive that 
victims of events have a dierent experience than 
bystanders, whose perspective is that of the third 
party. Should it not be the case that their reactionary 
blame would also be dierent? Ultimately, the ways 
in which I’ve examined both the hypocrite cases and 
the cases involving moral luck provide motivations 
to question how philosophy of blame has somehow 
avoided studying pluralistic theories thus far.
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